Between 1870 and 1913 convergence among present OECD members (or an even wider sample of countries) was dramatic, about as dramatic as it has been over the past century and a half. What were the sources of the convergence? One prime candidate is mass migration. This paper offers some estimates which suggest that migration could account for very large shares of the convergence in labor productivity and real wages, though a much smaller share in GDP per capita. One might conclude, therefore, that virtual cessation of convergence in the interwar period could be partially explained by the imposition of quotas and other barriers to migration.
Introduction
Some fifty million Europeans emigrated in the century before 1913. The vast majority, about 46 million, left Europe for the New World and the numbers increased over time. The Old World population rose from about 192 million in 1800 to about 423 million in 1900, so annual gross emigration rates averaged about two per thousand over the century, and even higher-above ten per thousand in many countries-after 1880 (Kenwood and Lougheed 1992) . This "mass" migration was on a scale not witnessed before nor since, and it generated debate on the impact of the migrations in sending and receiving regions, the relative power of "push" and "pull," the distributional consequences of the migrations (who gained and who lost), and whether the migrations should have been controlled or free. A central premise everywhere in the debate has, of course, been that migration improved the lot of those who moved since real wages were higher in the destination regions. But what about the stayers in the Old World and the natives in the New World? Did the mass migrations have a powerful impact on labor markets in the sending and receiving regions? Economists like John Stuart Mill, writing before the mass migrations began in 1 Mill (1929 1 Mill ( [1848 ). 2 Flam and Flanders (1991, 59) . Heckscher understood that with impediments to trade or with specialization outside cones of diversification (a failure of "harmonic equilibrium," in his words), factor price convergence would be incomplete and factor migration necessary to obtain factor price equalization. earnest, and Eli Heckscher, writing just after they ceased, well understood the causes and consequences of such massive factor flows: factor price differentials, if not fully erased by trade in products, would stimulate factor migrations, raising world economic efficiency and eliminating factor price gaps between the "new" and "old" countries.
Unless it was offset by other forces, mass migration must have eased global labor market disequilibrium in the late nineteenth century and, thus, promoted convergence. Labor endowments shifted from poor sending to rich receiving regions thus helping erase some of the wage and labor productivity gaps between them. It certainly helped drive a wedge between labor force growth in the Old World and New: 0.7% versus 2.4% per annum between 1870 and 1910, respectively. The process reached its apex when migration rates surged around the turn of this century (Table 1) . 3 The age of uncontrolled mass migration ceased, of course, after the U.S. quotas were imposed in the 1920s, and whatever contribution the migrations made to economic convergence must have ceased as well.
The question of convergence has long captivated theorists and empiricists, but the aim of this paper is to show how the convergence literature must confront and incorporate the processes of international migration if our explanations are to be sufficiently comprehensive to cover historical experience since 1850. Closed-economy growth-convergence models are certainly inappropriate for any discussion of the late nineteenth century world economy, since it was characterized by a remarkably free flow of goods, capital and people. Indeed, this paper documents an important contribution of mass migration to convergence 1870-1910: a very large share of the significant convergence observed would have been erased had migration been suppressed. The estimated contribution of the mass migration is so large, in fact, that its impact on convergence must have been offset by a variety of countervailing forces: independent disequilibrating forces of technical change (faster in rich countries); and dependent offsetting forces of capital accumulation (international capital chasing after the migrants or native capital 3 Migration rates shown in Table 1 accumulation stimulated by the presence of migrants), of natural resource exploitation (frontier expansion and land settlement stimulated by population expansion), of trade (migrant labor favoring the expansion of labor-intensive activities in rich countries) or of productivity advance (migrant-labor induced scale economies). All of these processes no doubt warrant further investigation, modeling and empirical evaluation before a complete picture of late nineteenth century convergence can be assembled.
II. Convergence: Contemporary Debate and Late Nineteenth Century Facts
The central questions in the convergence debate are two: first, do we observe convergence in the world economy? second, what explains convergence or its absence?
Convergence models include the venerable first-generation contributions and their recent refinements (for example , Solow 1956; Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992) . The "new" growth theory has focused attention on generating endogenous growth, and even the possibility of divergence, without appeal to a deus ex machina like exogenous technological change. Some models allow for divergence via long-run increasing returns, from learning-by-doing or various externalities, or by adding additional accumulable factors such as human capital (for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Lucas 1988; Lucas 1990; Romer 1986) . Others have refined the notion of convergence to include local and global variants (Durlauf and Johnson 1995) .
Empirical work has proliferated, led by the pioneering contributions from Moses Abramovitz (1986) and William Baumol (1986) that built on the macroeconomic data collected by Angus Maddison (1982; 1989; . Abramovitz related the observed "catching up" of postwar Europe (on the United States) to a more general principle reminiscent of the "leader's handicap" theory of Veblen (1915) or the "advantages of backwardness" theory of Gerschenkron (1962) : namely, a country with lower productivity may exploit the technological gap with respect to the leader, import or imitate best practice technology and, hence, raise labor productivity and living standards. Abramovitz found GDP per worker dispersion has generally diminished over the last century or so (Table 2 , column 1), with an implied average convergence speed of about 1%
per annum, with particularly rapid convergence in the post-WWII period. Although Abramovitz characterized the convergence before 1913 as weak, it turns out that the speed of convergence then was very close to the long-run average. The interwar evidence seemed to suggest lost opportunities for catching up arising from autarkic tendencies in the world economy that obstructed capital, labor and technology flows. 4 Abramovitz (1986) anticipated many refinements contained in the subsequent literature.
He noted further the distinction to be drawn between the convergence hypothesis and the catch-up hypothesis: economic growth may depend on other factors besides technologically driven catch up, for example, physical or human capital deepening (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992; Dowrick and Nguyen 1989) . Furthermore, catch-up would be "self-limiting"-declining to zero as the productivity gap diminished. 5 Abramovitz also cited "trade and its rivalries" (including international factor flows) as important ingredients in the convergence process, although he did not pursue the subject in depth. Abramovitz contrasted convergence as measured by dispersion levels-now termed "σ-convergence"-with convergence measured by the extent to which poor countries grow faster than rich ones, as given by a Baumol-style (partial) correlation of growth rates and initial per capita income or productivity-now termed "β-convergence" (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) . He also noted many of the statistical problems later to plague convergence analysis, such as sample-selection bias (a tendency to accept falsely the convergence proposition when using only a sample of now-rich countries) and the errors-in-variables problem (a tendency for a growth rate versus initial income regression to generate false acceptance if there is measurement error in the historical data). Such problems were cause for criticism of Baumol's exploratory econometric analysis (De Long 1988) .
We have touched on convergence theory-what about fact? Tables 2 and 3 show exactly what it is we wish to explain. There we offer four measures of σ-convergence across the late nineteenth century. The last column is based on a 17-country sample that includes the twelve current European OECD countries listed in Table 3 plus three New World members, Australia, Canada and the USA, and two New World non-members, Argentina and Brazil. The first three columns exclude Ireland. The rate of convergence 1870-1913 in the first column was about 1%
4 The convergence speed is measured by the rate of decline of log (σ/µ), where σ is the standard deviation and µ is the mean.
5 That is, a "strong convergence" property where productivity or welfare levels converge over time, to be differentiated from "weak convergence" where only growth rates converge over time, with possible permanent gaps in levels.
per annum, roughly equal to the long-run convergence rate over the past century or so. The degree of convergence depends greatly, however, on the measure used and on the purchasingpower parity (PPP) comparison adopted. All three newer estimates in columns 2 through 4 record lower rates of convergence . Note also the extent to which late-nineteenth century convergence is diminished by the switch from Maddison's 1982 data ( about which variable provides the "correct" convergence criterion is also rooted in theoretical and empirical concerns to be discussed later: the dynamics of wage and output measures should be distinct and interest in a particular variable depends on the questions under consideration.
III. Migration and Convergence in Partial Equilibrium
Although technological catching up may well have been operative in the late nineteenth century, we identify instead another powerful convergence force. This paper takes seriously the possibility that "trade and its rivalries" mattered for late-nineteenth century convergence, a possibility already supported by other work on the Atlantic economy (Taylor 1996; O'Rourke and Williamson 1995a; O'Rourke and Williamson 1995b; O'Rourke, Williamson and Hatton 1994; O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996) . In particular, it takes seriously the possibility that international migrations can generate significant convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Hamilton and Whalley 1984) . If such is true generally, then it certainly ought to hold for the late nineteenth century when mass migrations reached a crescendo.
Did migration lower wages in receiving countries while raising them in sending countries? 6 The debate is at least as old as the industrial revolution, appearing first in Britain in the 1830s where witnesses before Parliamentary committees-including the Reverend Malthus-asserted that Irish immigrants were crowding out native unskilled workers. The assertion has been repeated often enough since. As Michael Greenwood and John McDowell (1986, 1745-47) Commission on Emigration appears to have shared Wicksell's view, at least as applied to Ireland.
The Commission concluded that a century of mass emigration had had a very positive effect on Irish wages. In the words of the Irish Commissioners, "emigration…has reduced the pressure of population on resources…and thus helped to maintain and even to increase our income per head" (1954, 140) . Frequently, then, authorities have asserted that migration raised living standards in sending regions and lowered them in receiving regions.
Can theory or fact support such assertions? Historical correlations between rates of labor force growth, migration, the real wage and labor productivity are unlikely to offer any clear answer to the question. True, from 1870 to 1913 there is a positive correlation between migration and population increase on the one hand and real wages on the other, but such correlations tell us more about labor supply responses than about the presence or absence of diminishing returns. In the absence of increasing returns, and in the presence of a given technology and at least one fixed factor (like land), all comparative static models in the classical Wicksellian tradition predict that migration tends to make labor cheaper in the immigrating country and scarcer in the emigrating country, especially in the short run when dynamic responses can be ignored. 6 The following three paragraphs draw on Hatton and Williamson (1994a, 20-21) .
-8 -A familiar partial equilibrium analysis of the assertion is offered in Figure 1 . There is no reason why the derived labor demand functions cannot be estimated. Given data on wage gaps and labor force distributions, there is also no reason why counterfactual
analysis cannot be applied to a diagram like Figure 1 . Indeed, Figure 1 has been drawn to be consistent with such late-nineteenth century estimates (using labor demand elasticity parameters estimated later in this paper). Furthermore, there is no reason why the two-region case in Figure 1 cannot be expanded to include our 17-country real-wage sample, allowing a decomposition of the contribution of mass migration to the convergence observed before WWI.
IV. Measuring the Impact of Migration on Convergence
Our multi-country study uses a counterfactual simulation approach. Our purpose is to assess migration's role in accounting for convergence as measured by the decline in dispersion between 1870 and 1910. The relevant data is shown in 
where the θ j are factor shares. Under long-run full employment conditions, competitive wages are equal to labor's marginal product, which is the marginal productivity condition
The dispersion measure is variance divided by mean squared; cf Table 1 where the square root of this measure was adopted for consistency with Abramovitz (1986) .
where, without loss of generality, we assume the producer price P is equal to one. Solving (1) and (2), taking K and R as fixed, produces an equation for the endogenous changes in wages and output:
where θ = θ L , and η = F LL -1 (w/L) is the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the wage holding all other inputs fixed. In the CES case it is easy to show that η -1 = -σ -1 (1 -θ), where σ = (1 -ρ) -1 is the elasticity of substitution. 10
Thus, the long-run migration impact on wages and output may be derived if migrant streams of population measured by M can be converted into labor supply shocks L*. Suppose, therefore, that for a given country a share α M of its migrant stream is active in the labor force, while its total population has an active share α POP . Moreover, assume that migrants have an effective-worker (or worker-quality) ratio of µ with respect to the total labor force-for example, a wage gap exists between the migrant stream and the resident labor force due to, say, skill premia. Hence, the labor content of the population is L = α POP POP, and the labor content of the migrant flow is dL = µ α M M POP. Defining γ = α M /α POP (the migrant-to-population ratio of labor-force participation rates) we obtain the expression L* = µ γ M.
We can now derive the simulation equations used to calculate the impact of migration on GDP per capita, per worker, and real wages:
10 Note that all impacts on wages and outputs are calculated as linear approximations. As we shall see, some of the calculated impacts are large, and so the approximations may not be valid. To check this we also calculated estimated impacts using a calibrated CES production function, given estimates of factor shares and the substitution parameter. It turns out that the differences are small and do not materially affect the conclusions of this paper. For example, the estimated wage impact on a "large shock" case like Argentina is 46% in the linear approximation, and 40% using the CES form. For Ireland, the impacts are -33% and -35%, respectively. For countries with smaller migration rates, the impacts are barely affected at all. Note also that under the ceteris paribus assumption, the price structure is invariant under the counterfactual so that the impacts on the nominal wage, the producer real wage, and the consumer real wage are identical: w* = (w/P)* = (w/CPI)*, where CPI is the consumer price deflator.
The simulations use the above equations to assess the impact of the mass migrations 1870-1910 on convergence in our "greater-Atlantic-economy" sample of 17 countries.
The data requirements for the counterfactuals are described in Appendix 2, but we offer a brief summary here. Where possible, we have used standard published sources. For real GDP, population and labor force we use Maddison's (1991) and other standard time-series sources; specifically, we sought to bias our M estimates downwards to prevent our overstating the migration-convergence linkage, and we did this by using upper-bound estimates of return migration rates to give conservative net flow estimates (see
Appendix 2). 11
We know much more about some parameters than others. Migrant quality is poorly documented, and the same migrant may have exhibited different quality relative to stayers back home and native-born abroad. The baseline assumption has been to set the effective worker ratio µ = 0.8 since we know that immigrants were considered low quality in the United States and that they typically entered at the bottom of the job ladder. 12
The parameter γ (relative labor participation rates) is based on detailed studies of AngloAmerican experience (Kuznets 1952; O'Rourke, Williamson and Hatton 1994) . We expect γ to exceed unity, since migrant streams self-select and have a relatively high proportion of young adult males. Estimates of γ from the United States and Britain range between 1.53 and 1.78 for 11 Our procedure was to compare the implicit return-rate in the raw immigration data series with other scholars' estimates of return rates as summarized in the work of Wyman (1993) and Nugent (1992) . We then used the more conservative (higher) figure in the final analysis.
12 Note that the concern here is with migrants' raw productivity, not adjusted for skills, experience or other characteristics. Still, given that the literature often asserts that Europe suffered a brain drain by the loss of the best and the brightest, we later subject µ to sensitivity analysis in the range 0.8-1.2. Note that an overstatement of µ or γ tends to understate the impact on GDP per capita while overstating the impact on the real wage and labor productivity. Thus, sensitivity analysis is especially important for these two parameters given the several measures of convergence being studied.
the late nineteenth century, so a mid-point estimate of 1.65 was chosen as the baseline parameter.
Guided by working-age population shares, one might guess α M to have been around 90% and α POP around 60%. Labor's share (θ) is documented in various country-studies of factor distribution, most of which were done in the 1960s. These estimates were supplemented by constructing alternative estimates of θ = wL/Y from data on average nominal wages, nominal output and labor force. Independent estimates of θ were thus derived for almost all countries, with the remainder covered by contiguous-country estimates (for example, Brazil uses Argentina's θ estimate).
Lastly, η was estimated as -σ/(1-θ), with σ estimated using standard techniques from the theory of labor demand (Hamermesh 1993) . Appendix 1 reports the estimation of σ using panel techniques on a 14-country subsample over the four decades 1870-1910. A "best guess" estimate of σ=1.00 (Cobb-Douglas technology) was used to derive the baseline estimates of η, a value close to the modern 70-country average of σ=0.75 reported by Hamermesh (1993) . 13 Table 3 . The third and fourth panels report counterfactual convergence or divergence.
V. The Contribution of Mass Migration to Convergence
The results certainly accord with intuition: in the absence of migration, wage and labor productivity levels would have been much higher in the New World and much lower in the Old;
and in the absence of migration, income per capita levels would typically (but not always) have been marginally higher in the New World and typically (but not always) marginally lower in the Old. Not surprisingly, the biggest counterfactual impact is seen in the countries that experienced the biggest migrations: by 1910, Irish wages would have been lower by 24%, Italian by 22% and Swedish by 8% and Argentine wages would have been higher by 27%, Australian by 17%,
Canadian by 18% and American by 9%. Labor productivities would have been similarly affected.
13 While σ=1.00 was used in the baseline analysis, alternative values of σ=0.5 and σ=2.0 were used in the sensitivity analysis. Note that, by (5) and (7), the wage and productivity impacts of any labor force shock will be the same in proportionate terms when σ=1. Overall, the results in Table 4 lend strong support to the hypothesis that mass migration made an important contribution to convergence in the late nineteenth century. Starting with the third panel first, we observe that real wage dispersion would have increased 7% 1870-1910, in contrast to the actual 28% decline seen (Table 3) . GDP per worker dispersion would have declined only 9% (versus actual, 29%), and GDP per capita dispersion would have declined only 9% (versus actual, 18%). New World-Old World wage gaps actually declined from 108% in 1870 to 85% in 1910, but in the absence of mass migration they would have risen to 128% in 1910 (a 10% counterfactual rise in the wage ratio, versus an 11% actual decline).
14 The 34% CGE impact was reduced to 9.2% with allowance made for international capital mobility. 15 The 25% CGE impact was reduced to 21% with allowance made for international capital mobility. 16 The 12% CGE impact was reduced to 6.6% with allowance made for international capital mobility.
Pairwise comparisons are also easily constructed using A summary is offered in Table 5 . In terms of the convergence accounted for by migration, the counterfactuals suggest that more than all (119%) of the real wage convergence 1870-1910 was attributable to migration, and almost three-quarters (72%) of the GDP per worker convergence. In contrast, one half (50%) of the GDP per capita convergence might have been due to migration.
The contribution of mass migration to convergence in the full sample and in the New and Old World differ, the latter being smaller and in some cases even negative. While the negative numbers may appear at first to be inconsistent with economic intutition, they make good sense when we appeal to segmentation in the global labor market. Immigrant flows were not everywhere efficiently distributed, since barriers to entry limited destination choices for many 17 Although the impact of mass migration within the Old World was much smaller than between the Old and New World, remember the caveat that migrations within Europe were underenumerated, another bias working against our migration-convergence hypothesis.
southern Europeans. This point is central to discussions about Latin migration experience, and it is invoked as an important determinant of Argentine economic performance (Díaz-Alejandro 1970; Hatton and Williamson 1994b; Taylor 1992; Taylor 1994 However, the small contribution of migration to convergence in each region illustrates our opening point: the major contribution of mass migration to late nineteenth century convergence was the enormous movement of almost 50 million Europeans to the New World, and the impact that this movement had on convergence between the two regions. The real wage convergence, as noted elsewhere, is in large part due to a narrowing of New World-Old World wage gaps, which fall from 108% in 1870 to 85% in 1910. The New World-Old World story stands in contrast to the quantitatively less important convergence within each region, an effect only further obscured by the imperfect wage-migration correlation .
The relative insensitivity of GDP per capita convergence to migration is a result of countervailing effects inherent in the algebra. For real wages or GDP per worker, higher values of γ (the migrant-to-population ratio of labor-force participation rates) amplify the impact of migration, but with GDP per capita the impact is muted. Why? In the former two cases, migration has a bigger impact on GDP, wage levels and labor force, the bigger is the relative labor content of the migrations. In the case of GDP per capita, the impacts are less clear. For example, with emigration, population outflow generally offsets diminishing returns in production, leaving a net positive impact on output per capita; but selectivity will take away a disproportionate share of the labor force (γ > 1), lowering output via labor supply losses, a negative impact on output per capita. The two exactly cancel out when, in equation (2), µ γ θ = 1. In our baseline case, µ = 0.8 18 Beyond our sample barriers to exit did exist-most emigration from Russia was illegal. On this, and for a more detailed discussion of migration policy, see Foreman-Peck (1992) and Nugent (1992 convergence is always more than explained by migration. As a conservative estimate, we could assert that mass migration accounted for at least all the real wage convergence and at least two thirds of the GDP per worker convergence. Finally, note the sensitivity of the GDP per capita impact to parameter assumptions. This should now come as no surprise given the previous discussion. When µ or γ are allowed to rise (so that µ γ θ > 1), the perverse divergence effect of migration appears for GDP per capita. Thus, our results raise another qualification to the convergence debate: when modeling migration and convergence, demographic considerations suggest care be taken in the selection of the variable documenting convergence.
VI. Qualifying the Bottom Line
So far, our baseline results argue that mass migration accounted for 119% of the real wage convergence observed in our sample of 17 New World and Old World countries between 1870
and 1910. Have we overexplained late nineteenth century convergence? Perhaps, but the fact is hardly surprising given that there were other forces at work, and at least one of them was strongly anti-convergent. First, what about capital accumulation? We know that capital accumulation was faster in the New World, so much so that the rate of capital deepening was faster in the U.S. than in any of her competitors (Wolff 1991) , and the same was probably true of other rich New World countries. There is evidence therefore that the mass migrations may have been at least partially offset by capital accumulation, and a large part of that capital widening was being carried by international capital flows which reached magnitudes unsurpassed before or since (Obstfeld and Taylor 1997; Eichengreen 1990; Edelstein 1982; Zevin 1992 The evidence on the role of global capital market responses is even more tentative, but Table 6B offers some upper-bound estimates under conditions of perfect international capital mobility. Allowance must be made for the mass migration of capital from Old World to New, some of it chasing after labor and all of it chasing after abundant natural resources. The dual scarcity of labor and capital in the open spaces of the New World was the key international factor market disequilibrium of that era, and it implied massive flows of both mobile factors (Green and Urquhart 1976) . International capital market integration was probably as well developed by the turn of the century as it is now (Neal 1985; Neal 1990; Zevin 1992; Obstfeld 1995) .
In Table 6B , the zero-net-migration counterfactual is implemented in a model where the labor supply shocks generate capital inflows or outflows in order to maintain a constant (worldplus-country-risk) rate of return on capital in each country. Specifically, log-differentiating the CES production function and marginal productivity conditions (cf equations 1 and 2) yields:
where, r is the rate of return on capital, and under a constant-returns-to-scale assumption θ L + θ K + θ R = 1. Given resources (R* = 0) and treating K as fully endogenous (r* = 0), we can solve again for wage and output responses with modified θ and η:
where θ′ and η′ are implicitly defined constants. Hence, the wage, productivity and output per capita responses are
Based on an assumption that θ R = 0.1, Table 6B suggest that capital-chasing-labor may have been a powerful anti-convergence influence in the late nineteenth century greater Atlantic economy.
The net result of the capital mobility assumption is that about 40% of wage convergence is accounted for by international factor movements, leaving approximately 60% to other forces. The findings for labor productivity are qualitatively similar: capital-chasing effects erase about threequarters of the pro-convergence effects of labor migration. The results for GDP per capita are somewhat inconclusive, but it does appear that the simultaneous movement of labor and capital in the late-nineteenth century might have been a net anti-convergence influence on per capita incomes.
Figure 2 offers a stylized treatment of the various countervailing forces, using the baseline estimates from Tables 6A and 6B. As we have argued above, several forces contributed positively to convergence in the late nineteenth century, not only mass migration (labor market integration forces, labeled LMI in Figure 2 ), but also commodity-price convergence (commodity market integration forces, labeled CMI), and any number of residual forces (RESID) such as technological catch up, unmeasured intra-European migration, human capital accumulation and the like. Conversely, as noted above, the capital flows of the late nineteenth century were an anticonvergence force, in that they raised wages and labor productivity in the rich New World, while lowering wages and labor productivity in the poor Old World (capital market integration, KMI, in 
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper suggests that the convergence literature has missed two crucial features of the late nineteenth century world economy. First, the key axis around which convergence centered was between Old World and New: along that axis hangs most of the convergence story for real wages 1870 O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996; O'Rourke, Williamson and Hatton 1994) .
Will this analysis of late-nineteenth-century mass migration hold up to closer scrutiny? It certainly will need more sophisticated analysis to help confirm it: since we have presented only a partial equilibrium analysis, a variety of omitted variables could offset rather more or less of the mass migration impact than we allow in Figure 2 -in which case technological catching-up might claim a more important role than the residual now suggests. 21 Still, we expect our results to offer a new perspective on the convergence debate, one relevant for economic historians and macroeconomists (Williamson 1996) . The convergence power of free migration, when it is tolerated, is likely to be substantial given the late-nineteenth century evidence. Cheap labor did not wait for foreign capital to seek it out; it did not ignore distant immobile natural resources that beckoned it to move; it did not wait for human capital accumulation or spillovers to initiate catching up at home; it just went in search of higher wages elsewhere. Convergence explanations based on technological or accumulation forces in closed-economy models miss this point. The millions on the move in the late nineteenth century didn't.
21 It does appear, however, that factor accumulation effects are the main source of convergence, at least for a sample drawn from the late-nineteenth century "Greater Atlantic Economy" (Taylor 1996) . Maddison (1982; ; ; O'Rourke and Williamson (1997) . 
Notes and Sources:
Dispersion measure and actual data as in Table 3 . On counterfactual, see text. Table 5 calculations performed for various parameter combinations. "Baseline" estimates (Table 5) shown by asterisk. (Table 5) shown by asterisk. 
APPENDIX 1: LABOR DEMAND ECONOMETRICS
The underlying objective of our regression analysis was to estimate the elasticity of substitution, σ, in both the New World and Old World. The estimate of σ was used, along with independent information on labor's share of income (θ, see Appendix 2), to provide an estimate of η = F LL -1 (w/L), the short-run wage elasticity of labor demand holding all other inputs fixed, and, thus, an estimate of the impact of migrationinduced labor-supply shocks on wages.
In this appendix we discuss the econometric methodology. Data sources for the econometric estimation (and for the rest of the paper) are documented in Appendix 2. Data for the econometrics consisted of a 14 country sample with annual estimates of real GDP, labor force, and real wages, from which "decadal" averages (1870-79, 1880-89, 1890-99, and 1900-13) were derived to generate a panel with four observations for each country.
Estimation Strategy and Results
We assume a general CES production function with technical change, Y = Ae rt (aL ρ + bK ρ + cR ρ ) 1/ρ it can be shown that producer wages w/P are related to aggregate output per worker according to ln(Y/L) = α + σ ln(w/P) + ρrt, where σ=1/(1-ρ) is the CES elasticity of substitution. If σ and θ are known, the labor demand elasticity is given by η = -σ/(1-θ). Estimates of σ may be taken from a number of estimating equations.
Three different theoretical frameworks formed the basis for our estimation strategy. The first follows the example of Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow (ACMS), by estimating log value-added per worker as a function of the log real wage. The basic panel estimation equation in this case was:
where the α i are country effects (dummies), the ψ t are time controls (either a trend or dummies), and the ε it are error terms.
The second theoretical framework is the marginal productivity condition (MPC):
A third alternative is to use the reciprocal relationship (RR) of the ACMS equation:
In all cases, the correct P is an output deflator or producer price series, but these are not widely available in our sample for the pre-1914 era. Indeed, many deflators used by Maddison et al. for the nineteenth century are just CPI (consumer price index) deflators. We will be using CPI deflators in the results that follow, though the results are not qualitatively different when the available producer price series are used instead. The reader is referred to our earlier version of this paper for those results (NBER Working Paper no. 4711, April 1994) . For the present, (W/P) will be a real wage consisting of a nominal wage deflated by a CPI. We are fortunate in that we have an internationally commensurate set of such real wage series for the sample in question.
We used all three of the above methods with eight different specifications on our panel data as follows:
1.
cross section for 1870-1879; 
Comparison to Existing Estimates of _
There already exists a large empirical literature which attempts to estimate the elasticity of substitution, both in the context of labor demand and production functions. These studies have generated estimates of _ which vary substantially and depend very strongly on the choice of the estimation equations and data.
Hamermesh ADDIN (1993) ADDIN extensively surveys the empirical labor demand literature. Those studies which are most comparable to our estimates are 15 studies of homogeneous labor demand utilizing data at the aggregate or large industry level to estimate _. Most of these studies directly estimated _ using some variant of the marginal productivity condition. Estimates of __ranged from 0.21 to 6.86, although _ was between 0.3 and 0.8 in two-thirds of the studies. Hamermesh surveyed approximately 70 studies which utilized aggregate data, and concluded that the mean estimate of _ was 0.75.
The other major branch of the literature is based on the CES production function and estimation equations similar to ACMS. According to Berndt ADDIN (1976) ADDIN those studies which have utilized cross-sectional data have generated estimates close to one, while estimates based on time series data have generally been lower. Berndt was able to reconcile these differences by improving the quality of the time series data, resulting in estimates of _ closer to one.
Our _ estimates generally fall within the ranges estimated in previous studies and also demonstrate the same dependence on the choice of functional form. Our "best guess" is _=1.0, with a range of 0.5 to 2.0 considered for the purposes of sensitivity analysis.
-A-4 - The 14 countries in our econometric sample were those countries included in Williamson's "Evolution of Global Labor Markets" (1995) for which real GDP data was also available. The countries are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Australia, Canada, and the United States. However, the real wage data set has since been revised and is fully described in O'Rourke and Williamson ADDIN (1997) ADDIN . Annual estimates for real GDP and labor force were also calculated, and then decadal averages (1870-79, 1880-89, 1890-99, and 1900-13) were utilized to generate the four observations for each country. The idea was to focus on benchmark observations, ignoring short-run annual variations, thus emerging with a panel totaling 56
observations. In each case, we attempted to exclude the impact of territorial changes.
SIMULATION DATA
The simulation exercises utilized the above data and additional data on real wages (at the benchmark years 1870 and 1910), GDP per capita (at benchmark years), GDP per worker (at benchmark years), labor's share in income (best estimates available) and avergage migration rates (between benchmark years) for all 17 countries-the above mentioned 14 plus Argentina, Brazil and Ireland. Mitchell, Brian R., European Historical Statistics, 1750 -1975 Mitchell, Brian R. International Historical Statistics, Europe, 1750 , 3rd ed., New York: Stockton Press, 1992 .
ABBREVIATIONS
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IHSE
Real GDP (Y)
For all but three of the countries in the sample (Great Britain, Portugal and Spain), estimates of real gross domestic product (GDP) were based on the estimates of Angus Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, Tables A.1, A.6, and A.8 . For those countries for which we used Maddison's estimates, 1985 real GDP (at 1985 U.S. relative prices) was taken from Table  A .1, p. 197. Maddison's GDP indices (1913 = 100) give consumer real wages in the benchmark years of 1870 and 1910, and to enable estimation of producer real wages (see below).
Labor's Share of Income ( )
Three approaches were used to obtain estimates of θ: (a) any existing direct estimates of θ were examined; (b) an implied θ = wL(1-u)/Y was calculated using estimates of wage rates, labor force, assumed unemployment rates, u, and output;
(c) if all else failed, "neighbor" country estimates were used.
In method (b) the urban unskilled nominal wage was used, it being assumed that this would be a proxy for the average nominal wage. This is reasonable, given that rural wages ought to be less, and urban skilled wages somewhat more, with a typical 1900 distribution of labor being at least 40% rural for most countries.
To the extent that this overstates θ we apply an acceptable negative bias to our impact calculations.
Sensitivity analysis will allow for ±0.10 variations in θ for each country.
ARGENTINA
Migration Rates (M)
Decadal averages are shown in Table A1 . Where only gross flows were available additional assumptions were made to allow estimates of net flows:
Ireland: since return migration was rare, and there were no inflows from other countries, we set net equal to gross.
Italy: the ratio of net to gross falls from .78 to .72 between the 1890s and 1900s, a modest fall given the surge in return migration; a crude linear projection backwards might have that ratio at .84 in the 1880s and .90 in the 1870s; hence, we assume the net rate to have been 3.86 in the 1870s and 5.12 in the 1880s.
Sweden: we project net to gross ratio backwards to the 1870s to be 0.95; hence, we assume net rate in 1870s was 2.81.
Norway: we assume net to gross ratio is like Sweden; we apply Swedish net/gross ratios by decade 1870-1910.
Portugal: we assume net to gross ratio is like Spain; we apply Spanish net/gross ratios by decade 1880-1910, and we assume 1870s ratio was equal to the 1880s ratio.
Spain: we assume rates the same as Portugal in the 1870s.
Brazil: we use the net to gross ratio from the 1890s (0.17) for 1870s and 1880s.
Data was sought on gross and net migration rates for all countries. Annual migratory flows were converted into rates using interpolated census estimates of population. Table IV :III, pp. 213-4, adjusted for clandestine emigrants. Population: ibid., using intercensal interpolation along exponential trends. Table A1 reports the raw return rate, averaged 1870-1910, implied by the basic data on gross and net flows for each country (Australia excepted). This was compared to other scholars' estimates of return rates in various studies summarized in Walter Nugent, Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870 -1914 , Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992 America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880 -1930 , Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993 . In three cases, our raw data produced return rates implausibly low (Denmark, Ireland and Italy), and so corrected rates based on Wyman's (p. 10) figures were adopted in order to prevent an overestimation bias for the impact of migration. 
